

Enterprise Scale Separation VMM Systems

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Issues of Some Secure Systems

- Poorly constructed secure systems
 - Error prone
 - Difficult to understand and maintain
- Security mechanisms/features are too complex or not matching with underlying systems to protect
 - Too difficult to specify security policies
 - Too difficult to understand security policy and enforcement mechanism
- Not enough qualified sys admins / security officers to manage the system in the organization
 - Full power of security mechanisms of the system is not being utilized
 - Security or performance may be sacrificed
 - Complex security policy and mechanism compound the problem



Xenon Construction


- Replaced Xen's FLASK security architecture with a simpler, more intuitive Xenon security architecture
 - Separation of security policy and enforcement mechanism
 - Intuitive and expressive policy language and interface that are tailored to the hypervisor
 - > Easy to validate security mechanisms
 - Easy to understand security policies
- Reduced in size and refactored the source code to significantly reduce its cyclomatic complexity
- Reduced attack surface of control domain (Domain-0)
- Provided a visual management interface for easy and intuitive security policy authoring, VM management and VM monitoring
- Added a network access policy that is easily configurable through the management interface
 - Enforced by Open vSwitch to restrict VM network access



Xenon Security Features

- Security Tags e.g., Red, Yellow, Admin, Operational, Entertainment
- Enclave Container for resources (e.g., VMs, hardware) that inherit the same Tag
- Relationship among Tags
 - A "conflict" between two or more tags can be defined, which will be translated into virtualization connectivity rules enforced by Xenon and network connectivity rules enforced by Open vSwitch
 - Hypervisor does not allow any communication between VMs with different tags
 - Open vSwitch does not allow any network communication between VMs with different tags
 - Option for VMs with two different tags cannot run at the same time on an Xenon host








- Xenon security policy restricts each VM's interface to the hypervisor via hypercall privileges and profiles
 - A VM interacts with the hypervisor through hypercalls
 - Hypercall privilege levels
 - Management privileged hypercalls mainly Dom0
 - > Security privileged hypercalls VM introspection, etc.
 - > Regular hypercalls
 - Every VM is required to have an associated hypercall profile
 - > VM introspection domain profile, Ubuntu 14.04 profile, etc.








- Persistent audit logging of all policy violations
 - Logs are stored outside the VM, physically separated from and inaccessible by the violating VM
 - Security policy can be configured to permit a maximum number of violations per VM
- Xenon security policies can be set dynamically (i.e., modified at runtime without rebooting)
 - Supports scalability and significantly reduces the need for downtime
 - Tags and VMs can be added but not removed








Xenon is More Than A Secure Hypervisor

- Out of the box, customers gain security and performance best practices
 - Preconfigured service VMs (e.g., network service VM)
 - Distribution of security policy through a signed XML policy document
 - Role-based access control for different administrative tasks
 - System admin role (e.g., starting, migrating VMs)
 - Security policy admin role (e.g., setting up security policies)
 - > System monitoring role
- Guide users to configure virtual computing environment securely through intuitive visual management tool
 - Provide hardware-independent secure configuration mechanism
 - Export & import policy "templates"
 - Visual management interface provides
 - An easy and intuitive way to author and understand security policy
 - > An easy way to manage and monitor user domains




Xenon is More Than A Secure Hypervisor (cont'd)

Hardware overview at-a-glance



Simple configuration of resources






Xenon is More Than A Secure Hypervisor (cont'd)


Create pre-configured Service VMs

Assign resources to unprivileged VMs






A Typical Xenon Host Configuration





Xenon Enterprise

Manage multiple Xenon hosts






Xenon Enterprise (cont'd)


Hosts & VMs

Enclaves, security labels, and VMs






Xenon Enterprise Provides Templates for Application-centric Cloud







Xenon Enterprise with Xenon's Enclaves Provides Secure Cloud Computing Platform for Multiple Applications





Security Implementation Details







Security Implementation Details (cont'd)

Enterprise-wide policy

Per-host configuration (including policy)

a simple policy ▼ 🚔 Profiles AnyDomU-AllowAll PV-Combined PVHVM-Combined PVH-Combined PV-LinuxGeneric PVHVM-LinuxGeneric PVH-Ubuntul4 PV-Ubuntul4-Security PV-Ubuntul4-Storage PVHVM-Ubuntul4-Network ▼ 🕋 Tags Enclave A Enclave B Enclave C Enclave D ▼ a Conflicts EnclavesConflict ●●●●● ▼ 🕋 SecLabels 🕨 S ED-pvLabell 🔵 ▶ 🕃 EB-pvLabell 🔘 🔻 🛜 EA-pvLabell 🗶 1 UUID: 429d17f3-043e-4e6e-b702-96923aea5 **fl** ID: 15 fil Guest role: none Max. hypercall rate: 10000 PV-Combined Enclave A ▶ S EC-pvLabell ○

```
▼ Policy
  ▼ a simple policy
    ► m Profiles
    ▼ 🚔 Tags
         Enclave A
         Enclave B
          Enclave C
         Enclave D
    ▼ Conflicts
        C EnclavesConflict ●●○●
    ▼ 🚔 SecLabels
      ► S ED-pvLabel1 •
      ► S EB-pvLabel1 ●
      ► S EA-pvLabel1 ●
      ► S EC-pvLabell ○
▼ 🚞 Domains
  ▶ D-0 Domain-0
  ► VIII EB-domu-2 ●
  ► Vm EB-domu-3 •
  ► 7 EB-domu-4
  ► VIII EB-domu-5 ●
  ▼ I EA-domu-4
      1 UUID: 7c045bb3-2edc-4785-9b4e-38f8374394fa
     S EA-pvLabell •
     fi Guest type: pv
    ► M VIFs
    ▶ 🕋 Disks
  ▼ m EC-domu-1 •
     1 UUID: 1b201240-f0el-4b45-9f0d-85188ffla847
     S EC-pvLabell O
      🚹 Guest type: pv
    ► m VIFs
    ▶ 🕋 Disks
  ► Vm ED-domu-5 •
```

► Vm ED-domu-6 ●

Policy + configuration distributed as signed XML document

```
<ns1:extraxlConfigKeyValPairs/>
               <ns1:domain ns1:uuid="b74f6840-69f3-42e7-90fe-845d299ef334" ns1:name="EB-domu-3" ns1
                    <ns1:pvBootOptKernel>/usr/local/lib/xen/boot/pv-grub-x86_64.gz</ns1:pvBootOptKern</pre>
                    <ns1:pvBootOptCmdline>(hd0,0)/boot/grub/menu.lst</ns1:pvBootOptCmdline>
                   <ns1:disks/>
                    <ns1:netAccessRestrictions ns1:whiteList="false"/>
                    <ns1:extraxlConfigKeyValPairs/>
                </ns1:domain>
                <ns1:domain ns1:uuid="2e5ef327-b88f-4c99-81ea-606a1f26ab06" ns1:name="EB-domu-4" ns1:</pre>
                    <nsi:pvBootOptKernel>/usr/local/lib/xen/boot/pv-grub-x86 64.gz</nsi:pvBootOptKern</pre>
                    <ns1:pvBootOptCmdline>(hd0,0)/boot/grub/menu.lst</ns1:pvBootOptCmdline>
                   sns1:vifs/>
                    <ns1:disks/>
                    <ns1:netAccessRestrictions ns1:whiteList="false"/>
                   <ns1:extraxlConfigKeyValPairs/>
                </ns1:domain>
           </ns1:domains>
       </ns1:enclave>
       <ns1:enclave ns1:taqUuidRef="5e328575-c43f-489c-a640-b109b557e85e">
            <ns1:domains>
               <ns1:domain ns1:uuid="7c045bb3-2edc-4785-9b4e-38f8374394fa" ns1:name="MigrateVM1-pv"
                    <ns1:pvBootOptKernel>/usr/local/lib/xen/boot/pv-grub-x86_64.gz</ns1:pvBootOptKern</pre>
                    <ns1:pvBootOptCmdline>(hd0,0)/boot/grub/menu.lst</ns1:pvBootOptCmdline>
                   <ns1:disks/>
                    <ns1:netAccessRestrictions ns1:whiteList="false"/>
                    <ns1:extraxlConfigKeyValPairs>
                        <ns1:xlConfigKeyValPair># PV configuration template/ns1:xlConfigKeyValPair>
                        <ns1:xlConfigKeyValPair>builder = "generic"</ns1:xlConfigKeyValPair>
                        <ns1:xlConfigKeyValPair>vif = [ "mac=00:16:3e:f0:75:6d,bridge=EAbr,script=vif
                        <ns1:xlConfigKeyValPair>disk = [ "script=block-iscsi,vdev=xvda,target=iqn=iqr
                   </ns1:extraxlConfigKeyValPairs>
               </ns1:domain>
           </ns1:domains>
       </nst:enclave>
   </nsi:enclaves>
   <ns1:netSwitches/>
   <ns1:storageLocations/>
</ns1:hostConfig>
```



Questions?